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On April 20, 2010, thousands of feet below layers of rock in the 
seabed of the Gulf of Mexico, oil and gas escaped through the cement that 
sealed the Macondo oil well.1  The crew of the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
rig had finalized drilling and then plugging the well until such time as a 
permanent production platform would take over managing the site.2  That 
day, the crew had conducted safety tests of well pressure and were satisfied 
that the well was secure.3  Several hours later, however, jets of mud 
exploded out of the water and shot above the drilling rig.4  The crew 
reported a blowout and began emergency procedures.5  However, the 
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1 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 247 
(Penguin Press 2011). 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 247-48. 
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blowout preventer, a 450-ton apparatus designed to cut into the pipe and 
seal the well, failed by a measure of 1.4 inches to cut through the pipe.6  
At 9:47 p.m., the crew heard hissing, which signified that gas was 
leaking from the well.7  Two minutes later, a series of explosions began to 
blow through the rig and set it aflame.8  Crew members fled by lifeboat, or 
by falling or jumping into the sea.9  One hundred and fifteen survivors 
either made it to a nearby ship, the Damon Bankston, or were found by the 
Coast Guard.10  Eleven people were killed.11  
Over 4.9 million barrels of oil, or approximately 205.8 million 
gallons, spilled into the Gulf of Mexico before the well was finally capped 
eighty-eight days later.12  ectively 
, once a relief well connected to the original well.13  
According to the Flow Rate Technical Group, a group of scientists 
convened by the federal government to assess the spill, it wa
accidental release of oil into marine waters. 14 
Much national legislation regulating the oil industry has been passed 
in the wake of disastrous oil spills.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
 was passed in 1969, following the Santa Barbara Oil Spill of the 
same year.15  Congress established the Oil Pollution Act and the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund in 1990 following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in 
Alaska.16  However, these responses did not anticipate or adequately 
envision a response to a disaster the magnitude of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Spill.  Although the Exxon Valdez spill was catastrophic, there is a 
finite amount of oil in a tanker.  Conversely, a blowout in a deepwater oil 
well poses a particularly serious threat because the potential size of a spill 
can be many times that of a tanker spill.  Moreover, plugging a blowout 
                                                     
6 Id. at 248; see also Mika Grondahl, et al., Investigating the Cause of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/06/21/us/20100621-






12 Id. at 249; Bettina Boxall, Oil Spill Size Near Upper Range of Earlier Estimates, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 
3, 2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/03/nation/la-na-oil-spill-20100803. 
13 YERGIN, supra note 1, at 249. 
14 Erin Aigner et al., Tracking the Oil Spill in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES,  (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/01/us/20100501-oil-spill-tracker.html. 
15 YERGIN, supra note 1, at 249. 
16 Id.; U.S. EPA, Oil Pollution Act Overview, 
http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm; U.S. Coast Guard, The Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund (OSLTF), http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp. 
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nearly 5,000 feet underwater where divers cannot easily swim necessitates 
specialized equipment and engineering ingenuity.17 
Along with provoking a reevaluation of federal regulation of the 
offshore oil industry in the U.S., the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill drew 
attention to the fact that international law does not specifically regulate 
offshore oil drilling.  Although the spill did not apparently pollute other 
itorial waters, the potential for pollution beyond 
U.S. borders stirred a renewed interest in the need to address international 
impacts of offshore oil drilling at an international level. This paper will 
provide a brief overview of existing international maritime law and how 
this legal regime did not or would not adequately address pollution from 
offshore oil drilling in three situations: the 2009 Montara oil spill off the 
coast of Australia, the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, and offshore oil drilling 
in the Arctic.  
 
I . International Law and Offshore O il Drilling Pollution 
 
 
18 however, the specific obligations 
related to the oil industry are geared towards regulating oil tankers, as 
opposed to offshore drilling.19  This is despite the fact that existing 
international law of the sea grew out of the discovery of massive reserves 
of oil and natural gas off of the U.S. coast and the concurrent advances in 
technology that allowed for offshore drilling.20  In 1945, President Truman 
issued a proclamation claiming exclusive jurisdiction for the United States 
over the natural resources in the seabed and subsoil of the U.S. continental 
shelf.21  Consequently, rather than crying foul and rejecting U.S. claims, 
other maritime nations claimed sovereignty over their own continental 
shelves.22  Within five years, which is unusually rapid, a new principle of 
customary international law regarding jurisdiction over resources on 
                                                     
17 YERGIN, supra note 1, at 247; Rebecca K. Richards, Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 10 J. Int'l Bus. & L. 387, 395-96 
(2011). 
18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
19 Kate Galbraith, Gap in Rules on Oil Spills F rom Wells, NEW YORK TIMES (May 16, 2010) available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/energy-environment/17green.html. See also UNCLOS, 
supra note 18. 
20 John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession 
and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 3-4 (2006); Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right?: 
The Expansion of Closed Seas and Its Consequences, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 14-15 (2011). 
21 Duff, supra note 20. 
22 Id. 
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continental shelves had emerged.23  Building upon these proclamations, in 
1956, the United Nations hosted its first Conference on the Law of the Sea 
and began the process of codifying the law of the sea.24  
 
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
 Presently, 162 states are party to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ), which entered into force on November 
16, 1994.25  
26  The U.S. is not a party.27  
However, in 1994 the U.S. signed the Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
was intended to cure 
certain defects in the Convention to allow the U.S., as well as other 
28  Aside from Part XI, the 
U.S. recognizes the convention provisions as customary law.29 
 Prior to UNCLOS, many states had wanted to extend territorial 
jurisdiction further than the previously-accepted three-mile limit in order to 
exploit oil, gas and other resources, regulate pollution, and defend national 
security.30  Under UNCLOS, states can develop and manage natural 
resources in their Exclusive Economic Zone s 200 
nautical miles from their shore.31  Once a state claims its EEZ, it can build 
offshore oil platforms for drilling.32  
 However, UNCLOS does not specifically regulate offshore drilling 
practices.  Rather, it imposes obligations on states to regulate offshore 
platforms construction, offshore drilling, and clean-ups of related pollution 
under general principles.  
preserve the marine environment,
                                                     
23 Id. 
24 See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A historical perspective, OCEANS AND 
LAW OF THE SEA, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, (last accessed Mar. 26, 
2012), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm; 
Shackelford, supra note 20, at 13. 
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN TREATY DATABASE, (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Te
mp=mtdsg3&lang=en#1. 
26 Duff, supra note 20, at 1.  
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN TREATY DATABASE, supra note 25. 
28 Duff, supra note 20, at 2. 
29 Yee Huang, International Law Implications of the BP Oil Spill, CENTRE FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 
(June 8, 2010), http://www.cprblog.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=FBF393AA-EE0A-FF0C-
695B9BA163B50BDB. 
30 Shackelford, supra note 20, at 15-16. 
31 Id. at 23-24. 
32 Id. 
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spills reaches the shores of other states.33  Article 208 requires coastal 
pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with 
seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from . . . installations and 
structures under their jurisdiction. 34  [national] 
laws, regulations and measures . . . be no less effective than international 
35 
 Nevertheless, these general principles have not yet successfully 
been used to provide legal redress from oil spills from offshore drilling.  As 
platforms, is its framework for international cooperation and its attempt to 
harmonize standards for this pollution. 36  
 
 
B. International Maritime Organization Code for the Construction 
and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
 
 The International Maritime Organization  is a specialized 
agency under the auspices of the United Nations system and was 
established by the Convention on the International Maritime 
Organization.37  UNCLOS 
international shipping rules and standards in matters concerning maritime 
safety, efficiency of navigation and the prevention and control of marine 
38  The IMO established the Code 
for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 
which member states are supposed to incorporate into national legislation. 
The U.S., for example, meets its obligations in this regard with statutes and 
regulations that are implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard.39  However, this 
40 
 
                                                     
33 UNCLOS, supra note 18; and James Harrison, The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and International Law, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OBSERVER (May 31, 2010), http://internationallawobserver.eu/2010/05/31/the-
gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-and-international-law/. 
34 UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 208(1). 
35 Id. art. 208(3). 
36 Huang, supra note 29. 
37 Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime 
Organization, LEG/MISC.6 at 7 (Sep. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/legal/documents/6.pdf. 
38 Id. 
39 Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 1077, 1083-84 (2011). 
40 Harrison, supra note 33. 
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C . Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
 
 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
disposal of waste generated by the 
normal operation of vessels.41  MARPOL 73/78 is the primary convention 
dealing with preventing marine pollution by ships caused by accidents or 
normal operation.42  As of December 2001, 161 states are party to the 
treaty.43  
 The U.S. implements its obligations under MARPOL 73/78 
of the U.S. Coast Guard.44  In particular, the APPS allows for civil and 
criminal penalties for violations of MARPOL 73/78 or regulations 
promulgated thereunder.45  
taken under this chapter shall be taken in accordance with international 
46  
 
47  However, the MARPOL 
directly arising from the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore 
processing of sea- 48  Nevertheless, under Annex I of 
MARPOL 73/78, fixed or floating offshore oil rigs must comply with the 
 content of the discharge without dilution does not 
49  However, the IMO Unified Interpretations 
of MARPOL 73/78 clarify the limits to which the treaty applies to offshore 
oil installations.50  Of the five categories of discharge from offshore 
installations, the Annex I requirements only apply to two categories:  the 
from 
which is produced by generators, fuel tanks, and pumps of 
                                                     
41 U.S. EPA, Marpol 73/78, http://www.epa.gov/owow/ocpd/marpol.html (last accessed Dec. 21, 2011). 
42 Kathryn T. Martin, U.S. Control Over Extraterritorial Water Pollution: The Interplay between 
International and Domestic Law, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 209, 211 (2009). 
43 U.S. EPA, supra note 41. 
44 Id. 
45 Martin, supra note 42. 
46 Id. 
47 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 184, as modified by Protocol, Feb. 17 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. art. 2(4) [hereinafter MARPOL 
73/78]. 
48 Id. art. 2(3)(b)(ii); ZHIGUO GAO, ED., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS 103-104, 1998. 
49 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 47, Annex I Regulation 21. 
50 GAO, supra note 48, at 105. 
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offshore installations.51  But MARPOL 73/78 Annex I does not regulate the 
52 which are the forms of 
53  
 
I I . Case Studies 
 
 The potential for offshore oil drilling pollution to have 
international impacts, combined with the lack of international law 
regulating offshore oil drilling, provides a frontier for international 
lawmaking.  By addressing existing gaps, international law could help 
prevent spills and could provide greater security and clarity for managing 
cleanups and compensation after spills.  Currently, nearly all aspects of 
offshore oil drilling are regulated by national governments.  Massive spills 
have occurred in territories of countries, such as the United States and 
Australia, that have relatively sophisticated legal systems in general and 
comprehensive regulations for offshore oil drilling in particular.  Offshore 
drilling in territories with less-developed legal systems could lead to a 
greater likelihood of a spill and to more damaging consequences.  The 
Montara Oil Spill off the coast of Australia shows that even countries with 
developed legal systems can have massive failures in regulatory vigilance, 
leading to international environmental damage and complicated liability 
issues.  The BP Deepwater Horizon spill is another example of a developed 
regulatory system failing to prevent a spill, although in a situation that did 
not lead to international damage from oil pollution.  Even so, the BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted problems caused by unclear 
jurisdictional authority under international law for mobile offshore drilling 
y are 
drilling.  Lastly, the potential for a spill from offshore oil drilling in the 
Arctic, where there are many territorial claims and a great potential for 
international impacts if a spill occurred, should be a significant impetus 
toward developing an international regulatory regime to prevent spills and 
to address their impacts once they occur. 
 
A. Montara Oil Spill  Timor Sea, 2009 
 
 
suffered a blowout and began discharging oil and gas into the Timor Sea, 
                                                     
51 Unified Interpretations of MARPOL 73/78 Annex I, 56.2. 
52 Id. 
53 GAO, supra note 48, at 106. 
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approximately 260 kilometers northwest of Western Australia.54  The 
ed a distance of four kilometres from the 
55  Around two 
gas was expelled from the top of the well, through the hatch on the top 
deck of the WHP, hitting the underside of the West Atlas drilling rig and 
56  
the blowout released between 200 and 400 barrels of oil per day,57 although 
a representative later admitted to the Montara Commission that initial 
releases were likely as high as 1,000 to 1,500 barrels of oil per day.58  The 
59  
Response teams eventually intercepted the well on November 1, 2009 and 
-made drilling 
fluid.60  However, a fire started that damaged the Montara WHP and the 
West Atlas rig.61  The fire and spill were halted on November 3, 2009, 
62  The blowout 
-based oil spill from an offshore oil 
platform, rather than a ship.63 
 In reporting to the Montara Commission, PTTEPAA claimed that 
the blowout was caused by a failure of the float on the casing shoe and a 
failure to install a 320mm Pressure Containment Cap (PCC) instead of a 
244mm PCC on the well.64  The failure of the float of the casing shoe led to 
65  The Montara Commission found 
                                                     
54 Montara oil spill, DEPARTMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENT, WATER, POPULATION AND 
COMMUNITIES, http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/oilspill.html (last accessed Nov. 26, 2011); Tina 
Hunter, The Montara Oil Spill and the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan: Disaster Response 
or Just a Disaster?, AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MARITIME LAW JOURNAL, Vol 24, No 2 at 47 
(2010) available at 
https://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/maritimejournal/article/viewFile/140/186. 
55 Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry at 5, 21 (June 2010) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/Montara-Report.pdf. 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 Id. at 301. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 38. 





61 Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, supra note 55, at 39. 
62 Id. 
63 Hunter, supra note 54, at 46. 
64 Id. at 48. 
65 Id. 
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erve sensible oilfield practices at the Montara 
66  The Montara Commission also found that the 
blowout likely would have been prevented if PTTEPAA had followed its 
Well Construction Standards and the well control practices that were 
67  However, the Montara 
Commission found that:  
 
the NT DoR was not a sufficiently diligent regulator: it 
should not have approved the Phase 1B Drilling Program 
for the Montara Oilfield in July 2009 as it did not reflect 
sensible oilfield practice; it also adopted a minimalist 
approach to its regulatory responsibilities. The way the 
regulator (the NT DoR) conducted its responsibilities gave 
In this case, the regulatory dog did not bark.68 
 
 The Montara Commission estimated that over the 74-day period, 
the blowout leaked between 400 and 1500 barrels of oil a day, making it 
69  Between 1965 and 1984, there 
had been six blowouts from offshore drilling operations, which either 
leaked no oil or negligible amounts of oil.70  However, the Montara spill 
affected an area of approximately 90,000 square kilometers with oil sheen 
and weathered oil patches.71  In addition to the environmental damage that 
the oil spill posed, the Montara Commission noted that the dispersants used 
during the clean-up were a cause for environmental concern.72 
 However, the Montara Commission stated that the environmental 
73  
tle 
74  Therefore, although samples of 
species and habitat were taken after the spill, comparing the current health 
of the area to that of the area before the spill is difficult.  The information 
that the Montara Co
                                                     
66 Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, supra note 55, at 6. 
67 Id. at 6-7. 
68 Id. at 6. 
69 Id. at 38, 301. 
70 Id. at 38. 
71 Id. at 5, 23. 
72 Id. at 23. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 39. 
 
188 CHI.-KENT J. INT L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 
could have had an adverse effect on coral spawn and fish larvae and other 
without baseline data.75  Moreover, scientific monitoring did not begin 
immediately after the spill occurred and did not adequately monitor the 
subsurface effects of the oil/dispersant mix.76  The subsurface habitats and 
species were of particular concern because the dispersants act to sink oil.77 
 Unlike the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Montara spill 
affected EEZ areas of neighboring countries.78  The Montara Commission 
recognized evidence that oil had entered Indonesian and Timor Leste 
79  Indonesian Transport Minister, Freddy 
80  The Governor of 
s East Nusa Tenggara province called for damages to be paid for 
dustry caused by the oil pollution.81  
82  
Following an investigation by the Indonesian government, which 
concluded that oil from the Montara spill had entered Indonesian territory, 
the Thai Prime Minister and Indonesian Prime Minister discussed 
compensation for affected Indonesians.83  The Thai Prime Minister was 
involved because PTTEPAA was registered in Thailand.  The Thai 
Minister gave assurances that legal action could be avoided and that a 
compensation package of over 100 million baht could likely be arranged.84 
 
B. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill  Gulf of Mexico, 2010 
 
 The Macondo Well, where the BP Deepwater Horizon spill 
occurred, was located some fifty miles off the coast of Louisiana in the 
U.S. EEZ.85  
or that the Gulf Loop Current would carry the spill towards Europe, 
                                                     
75 Id. at 23. 
76 Id. at 26, 39. 
77 Id. at 26. 
78 See Hunter, supra note 54, at 47-48 (providing an overhead image of the spill location and its 
distance from neighboring countries). 
79 Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, supra note 55, at 26. 
80 Indonesia seeks compensation over Timor Sea oil spill, REUTERS (Jul 22, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/22/us-indonesia-environment-compensation-
idUSTRE66L0K020100722. 
81 Indonesia: Austrialian damages sought for Timor sea oil pollution, Adnkronos International, 
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Business/?id=3.1.1290721864 (last accessed Nov. 26, 2011). 
82 Id. 
83 Thai Energy Min Optimistic over Oil Spill Dispute with Indonesia, ASIA PULSE (Oct. 10, 2011). 
84 Id. 
85 Campbell Robertson, Oil Leaking Underwater from Well in Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/us/25rig.html at A14. 
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evidence of such international impacts never materialized.86  Nevertheless, 
the BP Deepwater Horizon spill illustrates several key gaps in international 
maritime law related to offshore drilling. 
 Unlike the Montara oil spill, which occurred under some 250 feet 
of water,87 the seabed where the Macondo Well was drilled was nearly 
5,000 feet below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico.88  Deepwater oil wells 
are those that are drilled at 1,000 feet or more below the surface water.89  
Drilling at such depths poses added challenges in preventing, halting, and 
containing oil spills.90  The greater pressure, the colder temperatures, and 
the different currents create particular problems for equipment.91  When 
problems arise, human divers cannot address them because of the depth; 
rather, workers must instead rely on remotely operated vehicles 
92   It is more difficult to contain spills with booms, which are 
relatively ineffective due to the deep plumes of oil that are produced and 
because of greater wave action in deep waters.93 
 From a legal standpoint, one of the complications created by 
deepwater offshore drilling is the characterization of the drilling rigs as 
94  Offshore drilling in shallow water 
uses fixed rigs that are attached to the seabed with legs made of steel or 
concrete.95  This structure is not feasible in deep water because the length 
of the legs would not be economically or structurally sound.96  Deepwater 
drilling rigs, however, are mobile.  
 MODUs are drilling rigs used for deepwater wells and they are 
capable of floating and navigating between drill sites.97  Due to their 
mobile nature, some national laws and treaties, including UNCLOS, have 
                                                     
86 See Howard LaFranchi, International sensitivities: What if BP oil spill heads for Cuba?, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jun. 11, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2010/0611/International-sensitivities-What-if-BP-oil-spill-heads-for-Cuba; John M. Broder, 
Scientists Warn Oil Spill Could Threaten F lorida, N.Y. TIMES, (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/18spill.html; Seeking Answers on Oil Spill as Questions Mount, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/26primerWEB.html?pagewanted=all. 
87 Keith Bradsher, Relief Well Was Used to Halt Australian Spill, N.Y TIMES (May 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/us/03montara.html, at A14. 
88 YERGIN, supra note 1, at 247.  
89 Richards, supra note 17, at 390. 
90 Id. at 395 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 396 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 388. 
95 Offshore Drilling, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/extraction_offshore.asp 
(last visited, Mar. 27, 2012). 
96 Richards, supra note 17, at 396. 
97 Id. at 397. 
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98  
means a vessel, other than a public vessel of the United States, capable of 
engaging in drilling operations for exploration or exploitation of subsea 
99 
 
jurisdictional authority over these rigs unacceptably increases the risk of 
100  Under UNCLOS, a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
not have the plenary authority to completely regulate the drilling and 
101  For example, Deepwater Horizon 
was a MODU that operated in the U.S. EEZ, but which was registered in 
latter.102  Given the public backlash against BP following the spill, it is not 
surprising that the oil company voluntarily cooperated with the U.S. in the 
cleanup process.  However, this might not be the case in future spills.  
Moreover, the vagueness in jurisdictional authority may have contributed 
to lax regulatory oversight of the BP Deepwater Horizon operations that, in 
turn, may have failed to prevent the oil spill.103 
   
C . Arctic Offshore Drilling 
 
 
petroleum resources, given that it covers approximately six percent of the 
surface area of the planet, yet holds approximately twenty-two percent of 
104  
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels 
-four percent is 
                                                     
98 Id. 
99 33 C.F.R. § 140.10 (2011). 
100 Richards, supra note 17, at 387. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Broder, supra note 86 (In May 2010, the top federal regulator of offshore drilling in the gulf, 
dollars in revenues owed the federal government and had been lax in its oversight of the safety practices 
 
104 U.S. Geological Survey, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
North of the Arctic Circle, at 1, available at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf; U.S. 
Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic 
F eet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic (July 23, 2008), Press Release, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home. See also, Lars Kullerud, A 
green Arctic, Nature Vol 478 at 179 (Oct. 13, 2011). 
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estimated to occur offshore.105  The journal Nature 
price of oil is driving companies northwards, with drilling taking place or 
planned off the coast of Greenland and in the Kara, Barents and Chukchi 
106  In addition to drilling and exploration for petroleum resources, 
governments are increasing scientific research and military training 
activities in the Arctic,107 which some see 
to resources in vast swathes of territory under the United Nations 
108 
 Under UNCLOS, countries can claim rights to drill in the Arctic by 
showing that the area claimed is an extension of tha
shelf.109  To date, only Russia and Norway have submitted such claims.110  
Russia has claimed areas up to the North Pole, including territory over 
which Denmark and Canada may also have valid claims based on their 
geography.111  Russia, Canada, and Denmark may also have valid claims to 
the Lomonosov Ridge, due to its high topography.112  However, even 
countries that do not border the Arctic are making moves towards staking 
claims, such as China and South Korea, which maintain a presence in the 
area with icebreakers.113 
 Signatories to UNCLOS can submit claims within ten years after 
they ratify.114  Denmark ratified UNCLOS in 2004, Canada in 2003, Russia 
in 1997, Norway in 1996, and Iceland in 1985, while the U.S. has signed, 
but not yet ratified it.115  Nations, therefore, have a limited time to submit 
claims, and it is unclear how the region will be broken up. 
 In 2008, scientists from Durham University published a map 
showing the full melange of claims, potential claims based on the 
continental shelf, claimed EEZ boundaries, boundaries agreed to by treaty, 
overlapping claims, and overlapping EEZ areas.116  The scientists drew up 
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the map following international outrage when Russia planted a flag on the 
seabed at the North Pole.117  The authors explained
show all known claims; agreed boundaries and one thing that has not 





 Offshore oil drilling provides a frontier for the development of 
international law.  Existing international law does not adequately address 
responses to oil spills from offshore oil rigs.  In cases such as the Montara 
oil spill, compensation and cleanup is generally dealt with by domestic law 
of the countries in which a spill occurs and where the participants are 
registered. Australia, for example, has a relatively developed legal system 
to address regulating oil drilling and adjudicating liability.  However, if a 
spill occurs in the territory of a less developed legal system, the 
consequences could be even more disastrous.  Existing international law 
does not adequately address the vagueness of jurisdictional authority for 
MODUs that are registered in states other than the EEZ area in which they 
are drilling.  Lastly, an international convention that deals with specific 
rules and standards for both shallow and deepwater drilling would also 
provide better guidance for safely conducting drilling in the Arctic.  A well 
blowout in the Arctic could potentially create oil pollution that would 
area.  International law could address these gaps, furnish greater security 
and clarity for regulations to prevent spills, and provide for the 
management of cleanups and compensation after spills. 
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